

How do Spaniards vote in European Elections?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The underlying aim of this study is to UNDERTAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE 7 JUNE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS in Spain, in the context of those registered in the other EU Member countries. The UNDERLYING IDEAS of this study are as follows:

1. THE LEFT ACHIEVED A MORE BALANCED RESULT than some analyses would attempt to suggest. The results are to a considerable extent explained by fragmentation of the vote and greater abstention.
 - a. In general, the dispersal of votes for parties of the left is greater than the dispersal for right-wing parties, and Spain in fact provides a clear example of this. If we take into consideration all the left and centre-left options, and all the conservative options, the resulting map is much more finely shaded. In countries such as France, Germany, Portugal (and also in Spain, as already mentioned), the percentage vote received by left-wing groupings was greater than the vote for the parties of the right.
 - b. The figures from the most recent European Election Study reveal that 58% of Europeans define themselves mainly as being in the left or centre-left. The centre-right parliamentary majority is the result not only of the aforementioned fragmentation, but also a higher rate of abstention (62% of European abstentions are by left and centre-left voters).
2. THROUGHOUT EUROPE WE FIND A BACKLASH EFFECT AGAINST THE GOVERNING PARTIES (THE "INCUMBENT EFFECT") AS A RESULT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, ALTHOUGH THIS IS MUCH LESS NOTABLE IN SPAIN THAN IN OTHER COUNTRIES
 - a. Voters have punished governments for the economic crisis, irrespective of the governing party (whether progressive or conservative). If we take this effect into account, of all parties currently in power, the PSOE has been one of the least harshly treated by voters as a result of the recession.
 - b. Some examples of this: Sarkozy suffered a downturn of almost 12 percentage points compared with the most recent general election in France; New Democracy, the governing party in Greece) was down 9.51 points; Sócrates, in Portugal, almost 19 points; Gordon Brown, in the

United Kingdom, close on 20 points, etc. Within a context of a widespread backlash against Europe's governments as a result of the global economic situation, the decline of the PSOE in these elections was considerably less severe (5.6% down on the 2008 general election).

3. NO CONCLUSIONS CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTION FOR THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTION. EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAVE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS WHICH MAKE THEM UNIQUE, MEANING WE CANNOT EXTRAPOLATE RESULTS TO OTHER ELECTIONS (WHETHER LOCAL, REGIONAL OR NATIONAL)

- a. First, because there is a "turnout effect" which very clearly impacts on the PSOE in European elections. As we all know, turnout in these elections was very low, a pattern generally seen in European elections. The fact is that the reduced turnout in this type of poll HAS A MUCH GREATER IMPACT ON THE PSOE THAN ON THE PP. The estimate is that of all abstentions in all European elections in which Spain has been involved, 78% have been from the left. It has furthermore been calculated that the "turnout effect" represented 0.77 points for the PSOE in these European elections.
- b. Secondly, because there is a "vote shift" effect which has a highly significant impact on the PSOE. The shift in vote does not mean that traditional PSOE voters are voting for the PP. It means that some are voting for other left-wing options, although if the elections were national, rather than European, they would vote for the PSOE. The estimate is that the "vote shifting" effect on the PSOE accounted for 2.60 percentage points.
- c. Taken together, the turnout effect and the shift in votes mean that the PSOE may have lost 3.37 percentage points in these elections. In other words, if the poll had been national rather than European and turnout had been similar to that seen in the 2008 national elections, the PSOE would probably have won the election.

INTRODUCTION*

In the aftermath of the 7 June elections we have seen a whole series of preconceived ideas which the right is propagating, with absolutely no basis in fact. The first of these ideas is that the right has won the 7 June elections, a conclusion which, as it stands, is wholly unfounded. It is true that the European People's Party won more seats than any other in the European Parliament. If, however, we add up all the seats shared by the centre-left and the left, the results begin to look somewhat different. The right does, of course, emerge as the winner, but the left does not do nearly as badly as many would claim. What is more, if we examine the results on a country by country basis, the issue takes on a completely different hue. In major countries such as France or Germany, the left won a larger share of the vote than the right. The same happened in Spain, while the situation in neighbouring Portugal was fairly similar. One cannot simply state categorically that the right won. The problem is that the left has a much more highly dispersed vote than the right, although if we take the entire vote into consideration, it would be fair to say that many countries have a left-wing majority, despite this not being converted into victories for the left as a result of this fragmentation.

The second preconceived idea we aim to rebut through this report is that the PP beat the PSOE by a significant margin. We do not refute the evidence: the PP was 3 points ahead of the PSOE, but this result must be viewed in its proper context. The context being none other than a hugely severe economic crisis which has seen all or almost all governing parties suffer substantially as a result of the recession. In fact, the PSOE fared better than almost all other European governing parties. Parties such as Sarkozy's, in France, lost almost 12 points. Sócrates' party, in Portugal, over 18. The Labour Party, meanwhile, was down almost 20 points. In Germany, Angela Merkel improved on her result in the most recent national election, although when compared with the past European elections (the term of comparison used in that country) she was 7 points down. And so the story goes on. When placed in such a context, then, the 5.6% downturn in the PSOE's fortunes, while substantial, is much less drastic than the punishment meted out in some other countries of the European Union.

* This work was coordinated by Antonio Estella, Senior Fellow and Head of the European Section of the Fundación Ideas. Thanks go out for the comments made by Carlos Mulas, Guillermo Moreno, Noor Naqschbandi, Maria Zettel and Johannes von Stritzky and two anonymous readers on different versions of this working paper.

The third preconceived idea, which we will likewise rebut in this study, is that the results of the European elections serve as a foretaste for national elections. That is the line taken by the PP, day in and day out. That is the message the conservative media have time and again been trotting out. As always, there is a lack of substance to this analysis, substance which we aim to provide through this study. To begin with, such a low turnout makes it impossible to predict what would happen in a national election. The difference between the 2008 election and this European poll was around 30 percentage points. Meanwhile, the data included in this report provide unequivocal evidence that left-wingers abstain much more in general, but above all in European elections, than those on the right. Our calculation is that of all abstentions seen in all European elections, 78% are from among the ranks of the left. As a consequence, if the poll held on 7 June had been for a national rather than a European election, the PSOE would have gained an additional 0.77%.

Lastly, consideration must be given to what we refer to in this study as the “shifting vote” (or “semi-shifting vote”). What we have found is that in European elections, left-wing supporters shift in their voting patterns more than those of the right. In other words, in European elections left-wingers will vote for other options on the left rather than the PSOE, more than would be the case among PP supporters. However, in the case of national rather than European elections, those voters would once again vote for the PSOE. According to our calculations, the impact of this phenomenon on the PSOE is 2.60%, meaning that: the PSOE could have lost the aforementioned share of the vote as a result of this shift.

The combined effect of the two phenomena referred to above would add up to 3.37%. This suggests that, with a similar turnout to that seen in 2008, the PSOE would probably have received 3.37% more votes, which would have given it victory in a hypothetical national election, rather than a European poll, held 7 June.


We will now embark on an individual analysis of each of these circumstances in turn.

I. THE RESULTS OF THE LEFT IN THE ELECTION OF 7 JUNE

One of the main problems facing the left, not only in Spain but also in the rest of Europe, is the dispersal of its vote. In most European countries there are various left-wing options, while on the right the choices are much more limited. Spain is a good example of this, although by no means an isolated case. A fairly similar situation is to be found in our most significant European neighbour countries.


If, for example, one considers graph I.1, France presents a clear model for the point being made. In the 7 June European elections, the left-wing vote in France was well and truly scattered, while votes for the right were essentially taken up by Sarkozy's party, the UMP. If, however, we consider the percentage left-wing and right-wing votes as a whole, the landscape changes considerably: the left received almost 48% of the vote, and the right somewhat less than 39%. In the case of France, we are looking at a margin of almost 10 points.

Graph I.1: France




And France is in no way a case in isolation. We find a fairly similar picture painted in many other countries. In Germany, for example, the difference in the share of the vote between left and right in these last European elections was practically negligible (less than one point), as shown in graph I.2.

Graph I.2: Germany



The story in Portugal was fairly similar to that seen in France. As shown by graph I.3, the left outperformed the right, for these elections and in percentage terms, by almost 14 points.

Graph 1.3: Portugal



One could continue to cite many other examples which we have omitted in order not to try the reader's patience¹. The conclusion is clear: if the left-wing vote had not been so dispersed, the result of these elections would probably have been very different. At the very least there would have been a much closer distribution of seats in the EP than that reflected by the 7 June elections. The left, though, in Spain and in many of our neighbouring countries, has a highly fragmented vote, while the right enjoys a much more concentrated vote.

This furthermore explains the apparent paradox whereby most citizens define themselves as leftist (58% of those surveyed by the most recent *European Election Study*), whereas the right won more seats in the European Parliament².

¹ See the Appendix to section I of this study.


² See Table III.3, in the Appendix to section III of this study.

II. THE CRISIS TAKES ITS TOLL ON PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT, BUT ON SOME MORE THAN OTHERS

It is fairly clear that the economic crisis has taken its toll on those parties currently in power. The impact of the recession made its presence felt in these European Parliament elections, although the truth of the matter is that some governing parties have paid a higher price than others. Taking into consideration the economic climate, it would be fair to draw the conclusion that the PSOE emerged relatively unscathed from the most recent hustings.

Let us consider a few figures. In France, as illustrated by graph II.1, Sarkozy's party, the UMP, saw its vote decline by no less than 12 percentage points.


Graph II.1: France



France		
	NE 2007	EE 2009
UMP	39.5	27.8
UDF / MoDem	7.6	8.4
PS	24.7	16.48
FN	4.3	6.3
VERTS / EE	3.3	16.28
PCF	4.3	6
Others	12.7	18.74
Turnout	60.2	40.48

In Portugal, another country where the Socialists are in power, the governing party experienced an even greater setback, plunging 18.53% as may be seen in graph II.2.


Graph II. Portugal



Portugal		
	NE 2005	EE 2009
PS	45.1	26.57
PSD	28.7	31.69
CDS	7.3	8.37
CDU	7.6	10.66
BE	6.4	10.73
Others	4	11.98
Turnout	64	37.03


The downturn seen in other countries not governed by the left is likewise substantial. Graph II.3, for example, presents the figures for Greece. The governing party, New Democracy, slid back by 9.51% compared with the previous national election. Berlusconi also lost ground, although to a lesser extent. The only party to survive the carnage was perhaps Angela Merkel's CDU-CSU, which made slight gains in comparison with the previous national election, although if we compare figures with the last European elections (the national benchmark being used in Germany), we find that Chancellor Merkel's share fell by 7 percentage points (see Graphs II.4, II.5 and II.6).

Graph II.3: Greece




Greece		
	NE 2007	EE 2009
PASOK	40.6	36.65
ND	41.8	32.29
KKE	5.9	8.35
Others	8.1	22.71
Turnout	76.50%	52.63

Graph II.4: Italy



Italy		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
PdL	37.4	35.25
PD	33.2	26.14
LN	8.3	10.22
IdV	4.4	7.99
UDC	5.6	6.5
Others	11.1	13.9
Turnout	80.5	65.05


Graph II.5: Germany



Germany		
	NE 2005	EE 2009
SPD	34.2	20.8
CDU	27.8	30.7
CSU	7.4	7.2
FDP	9.8	11
GRÜNE	8.1	12.1
LINKE / PDS	8.7	7.5
Others	3.8	10.7
Turnout	77.7	43.3

As a consequence, and in conclusion, if we take into consideration the following group of countries: Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Portugal, together with Spain, the average backlash suffered by governing parties is almost 9% (see the Appendix to section II of this study), whereas in Spain the figure was only 5.36%, as shown in the following graph. This thus highlights the fact that out of all governing parties, the PSOE lost relatively fewer votes in comparison with the national election as a result of the economic crisis³.

Graph II.6: Spain



Spain		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
PP	39.94	42.23
PSOE	43.87	38.51
IU	3.77	3.73
UPyD	1.19	2.87
Others	11.23	12.66
Turnout	79.3	46

³ As may be seen in the Appendix to section II, all EU countries governed by Social Democratic parties suffered a backlash as a result of the crisis, except for Slovakia.

III. THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS CANNOT AUTOMATICALLY BE TRANSPOSED TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS


Spaniards vote differently depending on whether the elections are national or European. This argument will be backed up by empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of two factors making a European election different from a national poll:

- 1) The presence of a high level of abstention compared with national elections
- 2) The existence of a group of voters who shift their voting patterns depending on whether it is a European or a national election.

- 1) Differences in electoral turnout between EE and NE.

The chief argument is that in European elections the voter turnout is lower than for national elections, with particular consequences for the electoral results of left-wing parties. As may be seen in graph III .2, turnout is much lower for the European elections than in a national election, a factor exacerbated by the trend towards an increasing demobilisation of the electorate for European elections, as may be seen on the right-hand side of the graph.


Graph III.1: Turnout in Spain in European and national elections (1986-2009)



Source: Ministry of the Interior

The lower levels of turnout in Spain for European elections force us to consider whether any of the main parties is more affected by such abstention than others. Traditionally, the left-wing electorate is demobilised (or stays at home) more than right-wing voters in national elections. As indicated by Belén Barreiro (2004), the PSOE tends to find its share of the vote more heavily eroded by abstention than that of the PP. As the table below illustrates (graph III.3), the trend seen for both European and national elections suggests that the higher the turnout, the better in general the electoral results of the PSOE. In all those elections where voters have turned out in lower numbers, the PSOE's vote has declined, as in the case of the European elections of 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2009⁴. Meanwhile, as the number of voters increases, so does the Socialist share, as may be seen in the national elections of 1989, 1993, 1996, 2004 and 2008.

Graph III.2: Percentage of turnout and vote for PP and PSOE in EE and NE (1986-2009)



Source: Ministry of the Interior

This leads us to the conclusion that Spain's left-wing voters abstain more than the rightist electorate at all elections, whether European or national⁵. For the European

⁴ With the exception of the European elections in 1989, when the PP had not yet established itself as a serious opposition force capable of attracting voters from the centre ground held by the PSOE. One further exception came in the European elections of 2004, which were so close in date to the general election that they were not clearly defined as a second-tier election. The government had been formed too recently for the European elections to serve as a chance to teach the government a lesson. This was the period known as "Zapatero's honeymoon", with high levels of government approval (Font y Rodríguez 2007), translating into a large number of votes for the PSOE.

⁵ With the exception of the national elections of 1993 and 2008, when the left succeeded in mobilising a large number of stay-at-home voters. In the case of the 2004 national election, the high level of mobilisation may be attributed to the electoral campaign waged by each of the parties against a

elections in Spain (see table III.1 below), we find that the left does indeed become more demobilised than the right. If we calculate the average number of abstentions among left-wing voters for all European elections, we find that 78% stay away from the poll booths. In other words, for all EEs, approximately 78% of abstentions come from the left, and this could have considerable consequences for left-wing parties in terms of electoral results. This demobilisation of the left-wing vote is further exacerbated in European elections as opposed to national polls, as we will now see.

Over the period from 1989 to 2009, the average number of voters abstaining in Spanish national elections was 26.82%, while the figure for European elections in Spain is 43.91%. This substantial difference of 17.09% (see graph III.7 in the Appendix to section III) suggests the existence of “volatile voters” who do not vote in elections they consider as “second tier”, such as the European elections. In other words, given the lesser importance of European elections for their national government, a large number of voters who generally turn out for national polls choose not to do so for the European elections.

Table III.1: Distribution of electorate and of abstention by ideological positioning for European Elections in Spain (1989-2004)

Ideological positioning	Distribution of electorate	% of abstention				
		Total	1989	1994	1999	2004
Left	11.23	10.32	9.77	10.13	12.34	9.84
2	7.76	8.88	13.95	9.25	5.84	6.56
3	17.56	18.2	17.67	14.54	11.04	24.92
4	13.09	14.1	15.81	14.98	6.49	16.07
5	23.52	26.53	21.4	25.55	37.01	25.57
6	7.64	8.21	6.98	8.81	8.44	8.52
7	7.06	4.66	5.58	3.96	6.49	3.61
8	5.66	5.11	5.12	8.37	3.25	3.61
9	1.61	0.89	0.93	1.32	1.3	0.33
Right	4.87	3.11	2.79	3.08	7.79	0.98

Source: EES⁶

2) Differences in voting decisions between EE and NE:

backdrop influenced by the Madrid bombings of March 11, and the loss of popularity of the Partido Popular over the course of its mandate, an unfavourable view being held of the party's rule.

⁶ The post-electoral survey of the *European Election Study* includes individual data for all countries holding European Parliament elections from 1989 to 2004. For further details visit the website: <http://www.ees-homepage.net/>. European Social Source TREND FILE VERSION 0.96 MAY 3, 2008

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, there is a whole body of voters who cast their votes for different parties depending on whether it is a European or a national election. And European elections reveal two phenomena which highlight the existence of shifting voters. First, we find the tendency to vote for minority parties of a European or anti-European nature, regional parties, etc. Secondly, the majority parties tend to shed votes (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).

One way of highlighting this fact is by means of the so-called “semi-shifting vote”, measuring changes in voting patterns between EE and NE. A comparison between how people actually voted in the European elections and how they would have voted in a hypothetical national election will help show the way in which electoral results are affected by a shift in vote between the two types of poll. In other words, one individual may change his or her attitude to voting depending on whether the election is European or national.

If we compare the various European elections held so far⁷, we find various noteworthy patterns (for more detail on the results, see the Appendix to section III, tables 4, 5, 6 and 7). There is first of all evidence of a shift in vote between European and national elections in the case of Spain, with different impacts on majority and minority parties depending on the year of the European election. For example, the minority parties (IU, regional coalitions and parties, and others) benefited more from the shift in vote in the European elections of 1999 and 2004, gaining 2.7% and 1% overall, respectively. The minority parties lost out, meanwhile, in the 1989 European elections, with a drop of 0.8% in their share of the vote, while in the 1994 European elections, the decline was 1.4%.

Secondly, among the majority parties we find that the Socialist Party is the biggest loser in European polls as a result of the shift in vote, with its share falling by 10.4% in all European elections from 1989 to 2004 taken as a whole. The PP, meanwhile, enjoyed substantial gains of 9.1% of the vote in the four European elections. Furthermore, regarding the “turnout effect”⁸, we find that the PSOE is the victim of a negative overall impact, losing 3.1% of the vote in European elections, while the PP gains an additional 5.1% share of the vote, thanks to the mobilisation of its electorate.

⁷ This more detailed analysis in the Appendix to section III is confined to the period 1989-2004 as it is based on post-electoral surveys which are not yet available for 2009. The total sample of interviewees amounted to 4090 for the European elections held between 1989 and 2004 in Spain, with a distribution of approximately 950 individuals for each election.

⁸ The turnout effect is defined as the number of individuals abstaining in European elections but who would have voted had they been national elections.

Taking a more detailed view (see table III .3), we find that at each election the PSOE loses on average 2.6% as a result of a shift in vote. The 0.77% reduction caused by the turnout effect must be further subtracted from the figures. When added together, the two effects cost the PSOE on average 3.37% of the vote at each European election. The PP, on the other hand, gains 2.27% on average thanks to the shift in vote, added to the 1.27% caused by the turnout effect, to give an average boost of 3.55% at each European election.

Table III.2: Average effect of the semi-shifting vote and turnout for each European election in Spain

Spain EE	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect	Total
PSOE	-2.60	-0.77	-3.37
PP	2.27	1.27	3.55

We have in general seen how minority parties tend to gain votes at European elections, although this is not a set pattern for Spain. Meanwhile, although it is true that the majority parties suffer greater losses as a result of the shift in vote at each election, we find that the PP derives considerable gains from this, whereas the PSOE on the whole suffers losses.

If we compare different European elections, we find that the shift in vote varies for all parties depending on the poll in question: 10.9% in 1989, 5.4% in 1994, 7.9% in 1999, and 23.9% in 2004. Proof of these changes is sufficient basis for us to state that voters in European elections are capable of shifting their vote away from the party they would have voted for had it been a national poll. This then leads us to the conclusion that, although it is true that many voters in European elections vote the same way as they would have done in a national poll, there is another group of voters who act differently in a European election compared to how they would have voted for a national government (Franklin 2005).

By way of conclusion, over the course of this study we have demonstrated that there are indeed differential elements in the behaviour of Spanish voters which help us draw a distinction between European and national elections. These factors are: 1) the high rate of abstention in EEs compared with NEs, with a particular impact on the left-wing electorate; and 2) the presence of voters in an EE who choose to vote differently from how they would have done in a national election, generally giving their votes to minority parties, to the detriment of majority parties such as the PSOE.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:


Progressive values continue to dominate most of Europe; not all governments suffered equally in the 7 June elections; had it been a national election, the PSOE would probably have won.

We may, then, draw three conclusions as a result of this study:


- 1) The left did much better in these elections than may appear at first glance to be the case. If the left-wing vote had been less fragmented, the distribution of seats in the EP would have been much more favourable for the left.
- 2) All governments have suffered as a result of the economic crisis. Some, however, have suffered more than others. One of those to emerge most positively is the Spanish government, which saw a decline in its vote compared with the 2008 election, although not as severe as that experienced by many other governments.
- 3) The low level of turnout and the effect of the shifting vote led to the PSOE losing approximately 3.37 percentage points, while the PP gained 3.55%. Thus, these two variables explain almost the whole of the 3 point margin which the PP gained on the PSOE in the election. We can thus fairly confidently state that the PSOE would have won the election if it had been a national rather than a European poll.

Appendix to section I⁹

Graph I.1: France:




Graph I.2: Germany




⁹ All the graphs in the Appendix to section I are based on data obtained from: <http://www.elections2009-results.eu/>


Graph I.3 Portugal:




Graph I.4 Italy:




Graph I.5 United Kingdom:




Graph I.6 Belgium:




Graph I.7 Bulgaria:




Graph I.8 Denmark:




Graph I.9 Ireland:




Graph I.10 Greece:




Graph I.11 Spain:




Graph I.12 Luxembourg:




Graph I.13 Holland:




Graph I.14 Sweden:




Graph I.15 Finland:




Graph I.16 Austria:




Graph I.17 Slovakia:




Graph I.18 Slovenia:



Graph I.19 Hungary:




Graph I.20 European Parliament:




Appendix to section II¹⁰

Graph II.1



France		
	NE 2007	EE 2009
UMP	39.5	27.8
UDF / MoDEM	7.6	8.4
PS	24.7	16.48
FN	4.3	6.3
VERTS /EE	3.3	16.28
PCF	4.3	6
Others	12.7	18.74
Turnout	60.2	40.48


Graph II.2



Portugal		
	NE 2005	EE 2009
PS	45.1	26.57
PSD	28.7	31.69
CDS	7.3	8.37
CDU	7.6	10.66
BE	6.4	10.73
Others	4	11.98
Turnout	64	37.03


¹⁰ All the graphs in the Appendix to section II are based on sources from: *Parties and Elections in Europe*. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/> and the European Union : http://www.wahlen2009-ergebnisse.eu/es/index_es.html.

Graph II.3




Greece		
	NE 2007	EE 2009
PASOK	38.1	36.65
ND	41.8	32.29
KKE	8.2	8.35
Others	11.9	22.71
Turnout	76.50%	52.63

Graph II.4




Italy		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
PdL	37.4	35.25
PD	33.2	26.14
LN	8.3	10.22
IdV	4.4	7.99
UDC	5.6	6.5
Others	11.1	13.9
Turnout	80.5	65.05

Graph II.5




Germany		
	NE 2005	EE 2009
SPD	34.2	20.8
CDU	27.8	30.7
CSU	7.4	7.2
FDP	9.8	11
GRÜNE	8.1	12.1
LINKE / PDS	8.7	7.5
Others	3.8	10.7
Turnout	77.7	43.3

Graph II.6




Spain		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
PP	39.94	42.23
PSOE	43.87	38.51
IU	3.77	3.73
UpyD	1.19	2.87
Others	11.23	12.66
Turnout	73.9	46

Graph II.7




Austria		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
SPÖ	29.3	23.81
ÖVP	26.0	29.97
FPO	17.5	12.78
BZO	10.7	4.59
Grüne	10.4	9.74
Others	6.1	0
Turnout	78.8	45.34

Graph II.8




Bulgaria		
	NE 2005	EE 2009
GERB	-	24.36
BSP	31	18.5
NDSV	19.9	7.96
DPS	12.8	14.14
ATAKA	8.1	11.96
SDS	6.4	7.95
Others	8.9	1.32
Turnout	55.8	38.9

Graph II.9




Denmark		
	NE 2007	EE 2009
SD	25.5	20.9
V	26.2	19.6
KF	10.4	12.3
DF	13.9	14.8
SF	13	15.4
RV	5.1	4.1
Others	5.9	12.9
Turnout	86.5	59.52

Graph II.10




Slovakia		
	NE 2006	EE 2009
SMER-SD	29.1	32.02
SDKU-DS	18.4	16.99
MKP	11.7	(SMK-MKP) 11.34
SNS	11.7	5.56
LS-HZDS	8.8	8.98
KDH	8.3	10.87
KSS	3.9	1.65
SAS	-	4.72
Others	6.7	0
Turnout	54.7	19.64

Graph II.11




Slovenia		
	NE 2008	EE 2009
SD	30.5	18.45
SDS	29.3	26.45
zares	9.4	9.82
DeSUS	7.5	7.18
SNS	5.4	2.88
SLS	5.2	3.6
SMS		1.9
LDS	5.2	11.52
Others	4.2	0
Turnout	63.10	28.25

Graph II.12



Hungary		
	NE 2006	EE 2009
MSZP	43.2	17.38
FIDESZ - KDNP	42	56.37
SZDSZ	6.5	-
MDF	5.0	5.3
JOBBIK	-	14.77
Others	3.3	0
Turnout	67.8	36.29


Graph II.13



	NE 2005	EE 2009
CON	32.3	27
LAB	35.2	15.31
SNP	1.5	2.05
LD	22	13.36
SDLP	0.5	0.41
DUP	0.9	0.46
SF	0.6	0.65
UUP	0.5	0.43
UKIP		16.09
Greens		8.38
Others	5.9	15.86
Turnout	61.3	34.27


Appendix to section III

Graph III.1: Turnout in Spain in European and national elections (1986-2009)




Source: Ministry of the Interior

Graph III.2: Percentage of turnout and vote for PP and PSOE in EE and NE (1986-2009)




Source: Ministry of the Interior

Graph III.3: Percentage vote in European and national elections in the United Kingdom




Source: *Parties and Elections in Europe*. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/>

Graph III.4: Percentage vote in European and national elections in Greece



Source: *Parties and Elections in Europe*. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/>

Graph III.5: Percentage vote in European and national elections in Germany



Source: *Parties and Elections in Europe*. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/>

Graph III.6: Average percentage of abstention by type of election




Table III.1: Distribution of electorate and of abstention by ideological positioning for European Elections in Spain (1989-2004)

Ideological positioning	Distribution of electorate	% of abstention				
		Total	1989	1994	1999	2004
Left	11.23	10.32	9.77	10.13	12.34	9.84
2	7.76	8.88	13.95	9.25	5.84	6.56
3	17.56	18.2	17.67	14.54	11.04	24.92
4	13.09	14.1	15.81	14.98	6.49	16.07
5	23.52	26.53	21.4	25.55	37.01	25.57
6	7.64	8.21	6.98	8.81	8.44	8.52
7	7.06	4.66	5.58	3.96	6.49	3.61
8	5.66	5.11	5.12	8.37	3.25	3.61
9	1.61	0.89	0.93	1.32	1.3	0.33
Right	4.87	3.11	2.79	3.08	7.79	0.98

Source: EES¹¹

Table III.2: Average effect of the semi-shifting vote and turnout for each European election in Spain

Spain EE	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect	Total
PSOE	-2.60	-0.77	-3.37
PP	2.27	1.27	3.55

Table III.3: Total distribution of electorate and abstention by ideological positioning for European Elections in Europe (1986-2004)

Ideological positioning	Electorate %	Abstention %
Left	6.33	5.64
2	4.65	4.12
3	10.27	9.8
4	10.5	10.39
5	27.11	32.7
6	11.63	11.84
7	10.54	9.81
8	9.76	8.42
9	3.33	2.68
Right	5.89	4.61
Total population	54,948	17,442

Source: EES

¹¹ The post-electoral survey of the *European Election Study* includes individual data for all countries holding European Parliament elections from 1989 to 2004. For further details visit the website: <http://www.ees-homepage.net/>. European Social Source TREND FILE VERSION 0.96 MAY 3, 2008

Table III.4: Percentage semi -shifting vote and turnout effect in the 1989 European elections in Spain

Spain EE 1989	EE vote (%)	NE hypothetical vote (%)	Difference (EP-NP)	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect
PP	21.7	18.7	3	2.2	0.8
PSOE	40.2	43.5	-3.3	-2.9	-0.4
IU	6.2	8.6	-2.4	-2.1	-0.3
CDS	7.3	8.4	-1.1	-0.5	-0.6
CIU	4.3	4.4	-0.1	-0.1	0
HB	1.7	2.3	-0.6	-0.6	0
PNV/CN	1.9	0.9	1	0.7	0.3
Others	15.2	12.1	3.1	1.8	1.3

Source: van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. (1996).

Table III.5: Percentage semi -shifting vote and turnout effect in the 1994 European elections in Spain

Spain EE 1994	EE vote (%)	NE hypothetical vote (%)	Difference (EP-NP)	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect
PP	40.2	39.5	0.7	-0.2	0.9
PSOE	30.6	27.5	3.2	2.1	1.1
IU	13.6	16.7	-3.2	-1.8	-1.4
CiU	4.7	4.1	0.6	0.2	0.4
PNV	2.7	1.9	0.8	0.4	0.4
HB	0	0.1	-0.1	0	-0.1
CDS	1.1	1.5	-0.4	-0.2	-0.2
Others	7.1	8.7	-1.6	-0.5	-1.1

Source: van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. (1996).

Table III.6: Percentage semi -shifting vote and turnout effect in the 1999 European elections in Spain

Spain EE 1999	EE vote (%)	NE hypothetical vote (%)	Difference (EP-NP)	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect
PP	39.8	43.6	-3.8	-3.8	0
PSOE	35.3	33.2	2.1	1	1.1
IU	5.8	6	-0.2	-0.2	0
CiU	4.4	3.4	1	0.6	0.4
BNG	1.9	1.6	0.3	0.3	0
P Coalición Nacionalista & Europa de los Pueblos	0.4	0	0.4	0.4	0
CE Coalición Europea	0.4	0	0.4	0.4	0
Others	12	12.2	-0.2	1.2	-1.4

Source: van Egmond, M. (2007).

Table III.7: Percentage semi -shifting vote and turnout effect in the 2004 European elections in Spain¹²

Spain EE 2004	EE Vote (%)	NE hypothetical vote (%)	Difference (EP-NP)	Semi-shifting vote	Turnout effect
PSOE	43.5	58.9	-15.5	-10.6	-4.9
AP/PP	41.2	26.9	14.3	10.9	3.4
IU	4.2	5.1	-0.9	-0.7	-0.2
EP (Coalición por la Europa de los pueblos) /EDP	2.5	3.2	-0.7	0.6	0.1
Galeuska-Pueblos de Europa	5.2	4.3	0.9	0.6	0.3
Others	3.6	1.6	1.9	0.5	1.4

Source: The calculations were performed using data drawn from the EES and the Ministry of the Interior.

Table III.8: Logistical regression to explain turnout

Dependent variable: 0=not vote 1=vote	specification 1	specification 2
<i>Membership of the EU: bad, neither good nor bad, good</i>	0.357*** [0.065]	0.205** [0.101]
<i>Ideological positioning (left/right)</i>	0.035** [0.018]	0.053* [0.027]
<i>1994 Elections</i>	0.352*** [0.123]	0.740*** [0.167]
<i>1999 Elections</i>	0.708*** [0.128]	1.048*** [0.179]
<i>2004 Elections</i>	0.017 [0.114]	-
<i>Party identification</i>		0.627*** [0.101]
<i>Social class</i>		0.131* [0.069]
<i>Interest in politics in the EU</i>		0.322*** [0.084]
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU</i>		0.208** [0.101]
<i>Years of education</i>		0.088*** [0.019]

¹² It is hard to draw any manner of conclusion in the case of the 2004 election as to the effect of the “shifting vote” for the results of the PP and the PSOE. What would seem to have happened is that many PP voters chose to conceal their preferences in light of the impact of the electoral defeat suffered by the PP in the national election held barely 3 months earlier. Many of these voters served to swell the share of the PSOE in a hypothetical national election. We must not, however, overlook a substantial effect in the shift in voting patterns in accordance with the data set out in the table.

How do Spaniards vote in European Elections?

Constant	1.069*** [0.140]	4.167*** [0.436]
Remarks	3128	1801
R²	0.0225	0.0750

Standard errors in brackets

* significant to 10%; ** significant to 5%; *** significant to 1%

Table III.9: Logistical regression to explain the shift in vote between EE and NE

Dependent variable: vote for different parties in European and national elections	<i>Semi-shifting vote</i>	<i>Semi-shifting vote</i>
<i>Membership of the EU: bad, neither good nor bad, good</i>	-0.122 [0.125]	0.106 [0.088]
<i>Party identification</i>	-0.357** [0.147]	-0.416*** [0.118]
<i>Ideological positioning (left/right)</i>	-0.127*** [0.042]	-0.108*** [0.032]
Appraisal of the national government		-0.021 [0.103]
Gender	-0.359* [0.214]	
Age	0.018*** [0.007]	
Social class	0.027 [0.123]	
<i>Interest in politics in the EU</i>	-0.074 [0.127]	
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU</i>	-0.101 [0.153]	
Years of education	0.017 [0.035]	
<i>1994 Elections</i>	0.922*** [0.276]	
<i>1999 Elections</i>	1.032*** [0.286]	0.580** [0.286]
<i>2004 Elections</i>		2.087*** [0.280]
Constant	-38.804*** [13.009]	-3.696*** [0.500]
Remarks	1629	1340
R²	0.0651	0.0567

Standard errors in brackets
* significant to 10%; ** significant to 5%; *** significant to 1%

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